The Pink-Slipped in Combat Project
Telling the story of 48 Army Heroes who were Pink-Slipped in Combat
Please reach us at contact@pinkslippedveterans.com
Pink-Slipped Veterans and The Pink-Slipped in Combat Project
What is the Pink-Slipped Veterans Initiative?
Between 2013 and 2016, the U.S. Army conducted Officer Separation Boards (OSB), Enhanced Selective Early Retirement Boards (E-SERB), and Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERB), resulting in the involuntary separation of thousands of Regular Army (RA) active-duty Commissioned Officers, some of whom were actively serving in a combat zone or overseas. Among them were 48 U.S. Army Captains serving in Afghanistan, abruptly ordered to return to the United States and discharged no later than April 1, 2015.
The Pink-Slipped Veterans Initiative is dedicated to identifying service members who were involuntarily separated during the U.S. Army’s first reduction in force of the 21st century. The initiative seeks to ensure that their individual stories of duty, hardship, and perseverance are documented as part of the historical record, shedding light on a critical and forgotten chapter in modern military history.
What is the Pink-Slipped in Combat Project?
The Pink-Slipped in Combat Project is committed to uncovering the personal journeys of each of the 48 U.S. Army Captains, whose lives were upended by the abrupt end of their military service when they were involuntarily discharged in 2015. April 1, 2025 marks the 10 year anniversary of this historical event and the public still has little resolution on the U.S. Army's drawdown. More importantly, these Captains served with honor only to have their service cut short and their reputations forever tarnished as the result of the U.S. Army's rush to meet end strength levels by FY2015.
By capturing their stories of service, sacrifice, and resilience as they navigated the sudden and jarring transition from their distinguished military careers to civilian life, the project aims to preserve their legacy and provide insight into the profound challenges they faced. From leaving the bonds forged in the combat zone to confronting the uncertainty of civilian life, these officers navigated an overlooked aspect of military service: the unexpected and difficult transition out.
Through this effort, the Pink-Slipped in Combat Project seeks to honor these courageous officer's contributions and ensure their experiences are recognized and chronicled as part of the U.S. Army's historical force restructuring of the 21st century.
Why embark on the Pink-Slipped in Combat Project?
In 2014, amid the challenges of executing Operation Enduring Freedom combat operations in Afghanistan, 48 U.S. Army Captains, many who already endured previous deployments, received unexpected and life-altering news: they were being involuntarily separated from the military.
These officers, who had been serving with dedication and bravery, were ordered to return to the United States immediately, leaving behind their units, their fellow soldiers, and their sworn commitment to protect the nation.
Mandated to be discharged by April 1, 2015, they faced the daunting task of quickly transitioning out of the military. With minimal time to prepare for life after service and grapple with the emotional weight of being discharged while in a combat zone, these heroes faced an uncertain future while contending with public perceptions that questioned their suitability.
What caused the U.S. Army to restructure the force?
The exact decision-making behind issuing pink slips to U.S. Army officers during force restructuring remains unclear, but available information suggests it stemmed from budgetary constraints linked to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) mandated annual discretionary spending reductions to offset increases in the federal debt limit and enforcing sequestration when spending caps were exceeded. This led the Department of Defense (DoD) to adopt a cost-saving strategy in 2012, which included reducing and restructuring U.S. Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and downsizing U.S. Army forces from 562,000 active-duty personnel in FY2012 to an end strength of 490,000 by FY2017. Sequestration accelerated this timeline to FY2015.
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) mandates adjustments to end strength for each FY and adjustments to the permanent end strength (the minimum strength necessary to support two major regional contingencies and, more recently, the National Defense Strategy, as authorized by 10 USC 691 (this section was repealed by the FY2023 NDAA)).
Why did the U.S. Army target Regular Army Officers?
As part of the Pink-Slipped Veterans Initiative, a review of historical U.S. Army active-duty personnel authorizations under the NDAA was conducted to understand the events leading to the involuntary separation of U.S. Army officers. This analysis identified key catalysts, including the aftermath of 9/11, the Iraq surge from 2006 to 2008, and the temporary increase of 37,000 active-duty personnel in FY2010 and FY2011.
Between FY1999 and FY2003, the U.S. Army's authorized end strength was consistently set at 480,000. However, in FY2006 and FY2007, an additional 10,000 active-duty personnel were authorized for each year. Majors commissioned from Year group 1999 to 2003 and Captains commissioned between 2006 to 2009 were likely aimed so that the U.S. Army could to restore the active-duty component to pre-9/11 force levels and to reverse part of the personnel increase during the 2006 to 1009 timeframe
What types of Boards were held?
- Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERB) of FY2013 and FY2014 evaluated Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels
- Officer Separation Boards (OSBs) and Enhanced Selective Early Retirement Boards (E-SERBs) of FY2014 specifically targeted Majors from Year Groups 1999 to 2003
- Captains commissioned between 2006 and 2009 were also evaluated during FY2014 and FY2015 boards
Who was looked at for the Officer Separation Board (OSB), Enhanced Selective Early Retirement Board (E-SERB), and Selective Early Retirement Board (SERB)?
SERBs (FY2013 and FY2014):
In March and April 2013, HRC announced that a Selective Early Retirement Board (SERB) would be convened in August 2013 to involuntarily retire up to 360 of RA active-duty Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels in the ACC and in July 2014 to consider RA active-duty Colonels in the Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAGC) Competitive Category with a date of rank between December 9 2006 and April 1, 2010.
In May and July 2014, HRC announced that a SERB would be convened in November 2014 to consider RA active-duty Colonels in the Operations (OPS), Operations Support (OS), and Force Sustainment competitive categories with a date of rank of August 2, 2008 and November 12, 2010 and in November 2014 to consider RA active-duty Lieutenant Colonels in the Operations (OPS), Operations Support (OS), and Force Sustainment competitive categories ; this board was delayed to February 2015 and no additional information is available on this board.
OSBs and E-SERBs (FY2013 to FY2016):
In December 2013, HRC announced two major rounds of OSBs and E-SERBs that would be convened in FY2014 to evaluate active duty RA Army Competitive Category (ACC) Captains and Majors who were not on a list of officers recommended for promotion to the next higher grade, despite the fact that no promotion boards had yet to convene to consider these officers for a below the zone promotion, with the exception of those Majors with a a date of rank between October 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009 who were evaluated in January 2015
In June 2015, HRC announced second iteration of two major rounds of OSBs and E-SERBs that would be convened in FY2015 to evaluate Captains from the Army Nurse Corps (AN), Medical Service Corps (MS), and ACC who were not on a list of officers recommended for promotion to the next higher grade, despite the fact that no promotion boards had yet to convene to consider these officers for a below the zone promotion, with the exception of those AN Captains with a date of rank between June 22, 2010 to October 1, 2010 and MS Captains with date of rank between October 2, 2009 and October 1, 2010 who were evaluated in August 2015
In November 2015, HRC announced that one E-SERB would be convened in January 2016 for Lieutenant Colonels in the Operations (OPS), Operations Support (OS), and Force Sustainment competitive categories who were twice non-selected for promotion to Colonel during the FY15 Colonel, Army, promotion selection board and were not on a list of officers recommended for promotion.
What was the process for the OSB, E-SERB, and SERB?
Each MILPER message indicated that the OSB and E-SERB would examine the Officer's Board file for items that might warrant an elimination action or other type of separation or retirement.
Most Officers under review for the OSB and E-SERB were deemed non-probationary officers due to their time in grade and were entitled to due process and other protections against elimination actions initiated the U.S. Army under Army regulation 600-8-24.
For non-probationary officers who were selected for involuntary separation or early retirement, the U.S. Army did not provide to the Officer a justification for selection or statutory authority by which separation/retirement was lawful. They were simply pink-slipped with no explanation.
The U.S. Army did not allow for any "relook" or "Standby" Boards to be established or provide for an appeal process.
If Officers believed their selection for early retirement or separation resulted from an error in their military records or that their selection constituted an injustice, the U.S. Army pointed these officers to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) to seek relief.
What was the outcome of the Boards?
The exact number of Regular Army officers evaluated and subsequently retired or involuntarily separated during the U.S. Army's force restructuring remains uncertain.
Many of the Captains and Majors selected had stellar careers and, notwithstanding any active duty service obligation, would otherwise have been afforded due process prior to an elimination action being taken against them under Army Regulation 600-8-24 since they were deemed as non-probationary. However, the U.S. Army did not disclose the determining factors leading up to their selection or the statutory authority by which they were being discharged. Since there were no relooks, these Officers had no opportunity to plead their case until after separation.
In FY2014, approximately 19,000 nonprobationary U.S. Army Captains and Majors were assessed through OSBs and E-SERBs, resulting in nearly 2,000 officers receiving separation notices in 2015 without due process, explanation, or reference to statutory authority. The FY2015 evaluations included over non-probationary 4,000 Captains, with 740 recommended for separation or early retirement in 2016 in a similar manner.
Up to 1,200 Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels were considered under the FY2013 SERB, with as many as 360 facing involuntary retirement due to the fact that theses officers were twice nonselect for promotion, which is a lawful action.
How did the U.S. Army force restructuring affect current U.S. Army end strength levels?
The FY2013 SERB initiated the U.S. Army's first largest force restructuring of the 21st century, resulting in the involuntary retirement of up to 360 Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels. The FY2014 OSBs and E-SERBs further reduced the force by separating approximately 2,000 active-duty Captains—including 48 deployed in combat—and 550 active-duty Majors. By the end of 2015, the Army had downsized by roughly 20,000 personnel through a combination of attrition, reduced accessions, and separation boards.
Recent NDAA data provides insight into current force levels and the Army’s readiness for global conflicts. In FY2023, the Army's active-duty end strength dropped by 33,000—from 485,000 in FY2022 to 452,000—marking the first time in over 25 years that troop levels fell below the FY1999 benchmark of 480,000. This downward trend continued in FY2025, with end strength declining further to 442,300.
The U.S. Army’s Force Structure Transformation: A Plan Without Resources?
In February 2024, the U.S. Army announced a series of force structure changes based on the findings of its year-long Total Army Analysis. The restructuring plan, outlined in the Army White Paper Army Force Structure Transformation, sets forth an ambitious goal: reconfiguring the force structure to accommodate an active-duty end strength of 470,000 personnel by FY2029. However, a closer examination of the numbers and budgetary realities suggests a significant gap between the U.S. Army’s aspirations and its available resources.
The Discrepancy Between Goals and Authorization
The U.S. Army’s justification for restructuring is rooted in a stark contrast between its desired force structure and its authorized personnel levels. While the Army contends that its current structure was built to sustain 494,000 soldiers, the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) only authorized an end strength of 445,000 active-duty personnel. By FY2025, the NDAA authorized number decreased further to 442,300—marking a downward trend rather than an expansion.
Despite these constraints, the U.S. Army proposes to expand to 470,000 active-duty personnel by FY2029. This represents an increase of 27,700 soldiers beyond its currently funded end strength. Yet, there is little evidence to suggest that the U.S. Army has the financial backing necessary to achieve this goal. The Department of Defense’s (DoD) FY2025 Budget Request, submitted in April 2024—after the Army announced its restructuring—only requested funding for an end strength of 442,300. Notably, this budget request aligns with the NDAA’s final authorization, which contains no provisions for additional personnel funding beyond the current levels.
Force Reductions from 2014 to 2016 and the Afghanistan Withdrawal
The U.S. Army's current force structure challenges cannot be examined in isolation from past reductions. Between 2014 and 2016, the U.S. Army underwent significant force reductions, cutting thousands of active-duty Officers, 48 Captains of which were Pink-Slipped in Combat. These cuts were driven by budget constraints, a shift in strategic priorities, and the drawdown of large-scale combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the time, the U.S. Army argued that the reductions were necessary to align with fiscal realities, though critics warned of long-term readiness concerns.
The withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 further impacted U.S. Army force structure planning. The conclusion of the two-decade-long conflict marked a shift away from counterinsurgency operations, leading to reassessments of force composition and deployment needs. However, the U.S. Army's current restructuring plan appears to overlook the enduring challenges posed by recruitment shortfalls and retention struggles that have persisted since the force drawdowns of the mid-2010s.
The Budgetary and Timeline Constraints
The most pressing issue is the timeline. With the FY2025 NDAA already enacted in December 2024, the next opportunity for the U.S. Army to request funding for additional personnel will not come until the FY2026 DoD Budget Request. This leaves only four fiscal years to achieve an increase of 27,700 soldiers. To meet its 470,000 goal within this timeframe, the Army would need to secure and sustain an additional 6,925 soldiers each fiscal year—a substantial commitment that requires not just congressional approval but also an expanded recruitment pipeline and funding for training and sustainment.
Yet, even if funding were secured, recruitment remains a persistent challenge. The Army’s White Paper emphasizes reconfiguring manpower authorizations as a means to restructure the force, but it largely sidesteps the U.S. Army’s well-documented struggles to meet its own recruitment targets. Without a significant turnaround in recruitment trends, the feasibility of achieving the desired end strength becomes even more tenuous.
A Reality Check on Readiness
The U.S. Army’s insistence on structuring its force for an end strength it has not been funded to sustain raises serious questions about strategic planning and resource management. The U.S. Army is currently operating at personnel levels not seen in over 25 years, yet it proposes a restructuring plan that assumes growth without demonstrating a viable means to achieve it. This disconnect between planning and reality not only undermines confidence in the feasibility of the transformation but also casts doubt on the U.S. Army’s ability to effectively prepare for future global conflicts.
While the U.S. Army’s stated goal of reconfiguration may be framed as a necessity for modern readiness, the numbers tell a different story. Without clear funding commitments and a proven ability to recruit, train, and retain the necessary personnel, the proposed force structure transformation appears less like a strategic realignment and more like an unfunded wish list.